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Medical Standard of Care Jurisprudence as Evolutionary
Process: Implications Under Managed Care
Charles Markowitz, M.D.*t
Medical malpractice lawsuits are by far the most numerous of the
professional negligence cases.1 Accordingly, the health care community
may serve as a paradigm for professional standards of care.2 But in the era
of "managed health care,"3 does modem medical practice truly comport
with the long standing tradition of a professional standard of care
privilege? This Article explores the jurisprudential evolution of this
standard and endeavors to conceptualize the potential impact of managed
care.
In an ordinary negligence case, a jury may find for the plaintiff by
concluding that the defendant's conduct fell below a "reasonable man"
standard.4 Direct evidence of compliance (or lack thereof) with a given
standard of care is not ordinarily considered. The jury merely weighs a
given risk against the utility of conduct, which either increases or lessens
that risk.6 In addition, outside opinions need not impact the jury-the jury
applies community standards in drawing upon its collective experience to
reach a verdict.'
This reasonableness standard does not apply to professionals, such as
doctors, lawyers, and accountants." Professionals must not only "exercise
reasonable care in what they do, but [must also] possess a minimum
amount of special knowledge and ability."9 The jury is usually instructed to
consider "the skill and learning commonly possessed by members of a
profession in good standing."'0 In professional malpractice cases, it thus
considers the standard of "what is customary and usual in a profession.""
This gives the court-recognized professions, most notably the medical
profession, the privilege of setting its own standards of practice. 2
In Rossell v. Volkswagen of America,13 the court found that a defendant
car manufacturer was not entitled to a professional standard of care in a
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product design liability case. 4 In support of its position, the court sets forth
a logistical construct to separate professional malpractice cases from
"commercial cases:"
The malpractice requirement that plaintiff show the details of conduct
practiced by others in defendant's profession is not some special favor
which the law gives to professionals who may be sued by their clients. It is,
instead, a method of holding such defendants to an even higher standard
of care than that of an ordinary, prudent person.... Such a technique has
not been applied in commercial settings, probably because the danger of
allowing a commercial group to set its own standard of what is reasonable
is not offset by professional obligations which tend to prevent the group
from setting standards at a low level in order to accommodate other
interests. Thus, it is the general law that industries are not permitted to
establish their own standard of conduct because they may be influenced
by motives of saving 'time, efforts or money."'
The Rossell opinion was written in 1985.16 Reconsidered in the context
of 2002 managed realities, one wonders if our present court system
romanticizes the professions in rationalizing a higher, privileged standard
of care. Is it not true that business interests heavily influence most modern
professions, including health care? If so, is the jurisprudential construct for
a "medical professional standard" an anachronism in today's world (hence
ripe for change)?
I. COMMON LAW ORIGINS OF A MEDICAL STANDARD OF CARE
Under the legal system of medieval England, plaintiffs required an
official form of action from the royal court (a "writ") that pertained to
particular classes of cases.'7 Prior to the fourteenth century, actionable
court complaints were generally based on the writ of trespass, or a variant
thereof (e.g., "trespass to the person, to land, or to goods"'). There was
originally no distinction between contract law and tort law.' 9 Hence,
professional malpractice cases often displayed tension between "breach of
covenant" (contract law) and "writ of trespass" against the person or case
(tort law). 0
The 1300s saw the development of what Professor Prosser described as
"the borderland of tort and contract," specifically involving those persons
practicing their professional trade or "calling."2' In The Oculist's Case2 of
1329, the plaintiffs counsel argued for a breach of covenant action against
a physician who failed to keep a promise to successfully treat the plaintiff's
eye disease.23 The presiding Justice ultimately rejected the contract law
approach.4 Instead, he linked the concept of "profession" with "man of
11: 1 (200 1)
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skill," comparing medical healers to farriers who negligently injured horses
while shoeing.25 By both tradition and law, one could not (at that time)
recover against the farrier; hence, he reasoned, one could not recover
26,
against a physician.
Although the early professional malpractice cases alleged violation of
an "assumpsit,'2 7 the courts generally found action based on "trespass on
the case."" Those professionals serving the public-at-large (often described
as engaged in a "calling") were thus held liable under pure tort theory,
with breach of covenant merely incidental to the alleged injury.9
Accordingly, in Tailboys v. Sherman (1443)," ° the presiding justice in a




The professional standard of care percolated through the socio-legal
evolutionary changes of the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries,
when medieval societies were stratified.32 Different professions enjoyed
variable degrees of legal status. 3 Prior to the Black Plague of the 1300s,
historians note an apparent "absolute" occupational privilege enjoyed by
physicians, protecting them against any liability for negligent injury or
death. Although not codified, this privilege was defined by absence of
regulations and hence lack of standards.35 Although medieval England had
instituted some urban social regulation by that time, such regulations did
36
not extend to the practice of medicine.
Seen in the light of physicians' privilege, plaintiffs' attempts to sue
under breach of assumpsit may be viewed as clever attempts to bypass
judiciary reluctance to hold physicians accountable for negligence.
Unfortunately, patients generally failed to obtain written agreements
before treatment, which would have been necessary for successful contract
litigation.37
Doctors' absolute privilege ended about the same time the chancery's
• 38
role in issuing writs increased. However, some chancellors continued to
refuse all writs against doctors, apparently under influence from particular
justices on the King's Bench. 9 Public health policy concerns likely affected
these views.40 But what of those doctors who refused to treat patients
during the Plague? Although doctors refusing service were arguably liable
for "nonfeasance" (not performing a required act), the great need for
their services continued to supplant liability for "misfeasance" (performing
an act improperly) .41 Thus, the necessities created by a public health
catastrophe granted physicians continued privilege against liability.
Since medical practice remained unregulated, courts grappled
erratically with the concept of a "standard." In Stratten v. Swanland (1374),42
a medieval case alleging that the plaintiffs hand was maimed by the
3
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surgeon's negligence, the standard appears to be based on moral fault
(e.g., "he tried with due diligence, therefore should not be held guilty"43).
There is no discussion of any breached standard of care.4 Then, in Skyrne
v. Butolf,45 another fourteenth-century case alleging the failure of a
physician to keep his promise to cure a patient's disease, the court
discussed the practitioner's actions as contrary to a generally held
standard.46 This is done in the context of deciding the issue of action based
on writ of trespass versus breach of covenant.4 7 The court suggests writ of
trespass requires definition of a local standard, whereas a suit based on
contract law does not.
4 8
By the early 1400s, nonfeasance had become the underlying basis for
contract law disputes, while misfeasance remained the basis for action in
tort. 9 But English tort law development subsequently produced a
dichotomy-"action upon the case for misfeasance," versus "action upon
the case for negligence., 50 This split was arguably crucial to the synthesis of
a professional standard of care construct. 5' According to Sir John Cromyn's
Digest of the Laws of England (1740),"2 "action upon the case for misfeasance"
pertained to "misadventure."5 3 It generally did not apply to skilled
professionals, appearing closer to relying on our modern "reasonable
man" standard of negligence. 4 By contrast, "action upon the case for
negligence" pertained to breach of duties "imposed by law," "imposed by
an office," or based upon "customs of the realm," thus seemingly
applicable to the professions.55
From where did this dichotomy arise? The English courts vacillated
between the search for breach of a professional standard, versus evaluation
of each individual defendant's skill (as noted in the "moral fault"
approach) .s6 Moral fault was arguably easier to adjudicate in an era when
standards of knowledge remained ill defined. In the absence of this
knowledge, professional negligence based on deviation from a standard
could best be defined as deviation from a legally imposed regulatory
standard, of which there were few.57 Thus the concept of professional
standards evolved in concurrence with subsequent government-imposed
regulations.58 The English aristocracy's desire for skilled professions to
serve the public-at-large may have engendered considerable leeway and
privilege in the development of these standards, including acquiescence to
"custom of the realm."55
It was within this context that King Henry VIII, in 1518, created by
royal charter the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons, seemingly
elevating the medical profession above all others in the professional
standard of care paradigm. The main purpose of the Royal College, as
defined by its Charter, included the granting of licenses to qualified
11:1 (2001)
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practitioners and the punishment of unqualified practitioners, including
those committing malpractice.61 Its reach extended to both physicians and
apothecaries." Originally its jurisdiction was confined to London, but an
Act of Parliament in 1523 extended the Ccllege's power to include all of
England.63
The Royal College established licensure methodology and
requirements for English physicians and surgeons.64 Ultimate authority
rested in its "Board of Censors," consisting of the Bishop of London (or
Dean of St. Paul), plus four physicians. 5 Licensure also required approval
of a diocese bishop (particularly if a "foreigner" applied), or else a diploma
from Oxford or Cambridge University.66 The original charter also granted
College member physicians an exemption from conscripted services, which
were still common at that time (e.g., watchmen and constables) .67
The Board of Censors acted much as a present day American state
medical board, albeit with enhanced power. It possessed judicial authority,
and could thus fine or imprison those persons practicing outside of their
regulations (e.g., a druggist sending medicine to a sick patient without a
doctor's prescription).6 They were even allowed to search apothecary
shops to ensure no "faulty drugs."66 Board members thus held a status on
par with judges. Hence the medical profession of that time was entrusted
with power to police itself, arguably a reflection of special social status.
The Royal Charter allowed physicians to regulate themselves through
self-imposed standards.6 Yet the Charter itself alludes to a standard of care
only once: "Where any person is condemned by the censors for not well
executing, practicing, or using the faculty of physick, he may within
fourteen days after notice appeal to the College, and the.judgment given
on such an appeal shall be final."7' Further definition of this standard thus
lay within the College's discretion.
Review of Victorian era case digests reveals a distinct paucity of
recorded medical malpractice cases. Laws of England (1920), describing
case law through the 1800s, suggests negligence actions against physicians
were "rarely successful. 72 There were occasional exceptions. A surgeon was
held "liable for ignorance and lack of skill" in Slater v. Baker.73 Later, Seare v.
Prentice,14 stated: "[E]very one who undertakes any office, employment,
trust or duty... to perform it with integrity, diligence and skill.. .if by his
want of either of these qualities any injury accrues to individuals, they have
therefor [sic] their remedy in damages.... , Still debating contract theory,
76the court in Pippin v. Shepard, wondered how contractual obligation could
be applied to physicians employed by public establishments. 77 "[I]t could
hardly be expected that the governors of an infirmary could bring an
action against the surgeon employed by them to attend the child of poor
5
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parents who may have suffered from his negligence and inattention. 78 The
holding in Gladwell v. Steggall,79 appears to clarify this point: "The substance
of the issue.. .is that the defendant was employed to cure the plaintiff, not
that he was employed by the plaintiff."80
Physician malpractice cases did occur with greater frequency by the
nineteenth century, but judicial holdings tended to favor "the learned
professions."8' Thus, in Lanphier v. Phipos, 82 the court held that "reasonable
skill," as applied to professionals, is "not [the] highest possible degree of
skill., 8 3 Later, the decision in Rich v. Pierpon e 4 set the bar even lower (for
medical professionals) with an amorphous standard:
[T] here must have been a want of competent and ordinary care and skill,
and to such a degree as to have led to a bad result. A medical man is
bound to have that degree of skill which cannot be defined, but which, in
the opinion of the jury, is a competent degree of skill and knowledge. 85
Many of these concepts were subsequently adopted by American
jurisprudence. 86 Further refinement of the English standard of care
construct did not occur until the late nineteenth century. Although
Parliament's Medical Act of 1858 facilitated the public's attempts to
distinguish between "qualified" and "unqualified" health practitioners,
"qualified" was defined simply as compliance with licensure requirements. 7
Interestingly, the Act of 1858 did not bar unqualified practitioners from
practicing. ss
The Medical Act of 1886 further codified the requirement for
physicians to register with the Royal College, and set a standard of
"infamous conduct" as sufficient grounds for removal.89 English case law
subsequently defined "infamous conduct" as "dishonorable and disgraceful
behavior."9 At the same time, cases continued to define the medical
standard of care not as the best care, but rather as "ordinary" care.91
American jurisprudence is arguably a product of English common
law's influence on the colonies, and subsequently on the fledgling United
States. Even a century after independence, it was not uncommon for
American legal texts to refer to the utility of English cases. Josiah Smith's A
Manual of Common Law (1875), an American publication of English
cases/legal theory, describes its own contents as "comprising the
fundamental principles and the points most usually occurring in daily life
and practice." 92 Its sole reference to standard of care for medical
malpractice displays an ambiguity true to its English origins: "gross
unskillfulness or carelessness. "93
In discussing more recent developments in the English law of liability,
ProfessorJohn Fleming had once noted:
11:1 (2001)
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Among the various professional groups, medical men seem to be the
most frequent target of tort litigation, and medical malpractice actions
furnish a microcosm of prevailing community and courtroom attitudes
towards the problem of professional liability. Since the end of [World
War II], there has been a noticeable increase in the volume of such
actions in England, though it has not nearly attained the proportions
endemic in the United States.4
II. MEDICAL STANDARD OF CARE IN AMERICAN CASE LAw
The earliest documented American physician malpractice case, Cross v.
Guthery,95 involved a charge of negligence in the performance of a
mastectomy. 96 The court ruled against the physician, reasoning he had set
out to perform "with skill and safety" yet did so "in the most unskillful,
ignorant and cruel manner, contrary to all the well known rules and
principles of practice in such cases., 97 Later, in McCandless v. McWha,98 a
court defined the standard of care as the physician's obligation "to treat
the case with diligence and skill.. .such reasonable skill and diligence as are
ordinarily exercised in [the] profession.. .such as thoroughly educated
surgeons ordinarily employ."
A concurrent case, Leighten v. Sargent,'00 set forth a similar standard of
reasonable skill, but added, "He does not undertake for extraordinary care
or extraordinary diligence, any more than he does for uncommon
skill... " 10' Further, that court maintained a residual element of contract
theory, stating: "In stipulating to exert his skill, and apply his diligence and
care, the medical or other professional men contract to use their best
judgment..." 2 Although modern emphasis has since settled almost
exclusively on negligence theory, the contractual underpinnings of the
physician-patient relationship were never entirely abandoned, 0 3 and still
form the basis of many present-day suits against managed care
companies. °0
Although American- case law provides variable formulations of the
medical professional standard of care, the common elements have been
summarized as follows: "(1) A reasonable or ordinary degree of skill and
learning; (2) commonly possessed and exercised by members of the
profession[;] (3) who are of the same school or system as the defendant[;]
(4) and who practice in.. .similar localities; (5) and exercise of the
defendant's good judgment."''05
Physicians who comply with such standards are generally shielded
from liability, since compliance is held as evidence of proper care."'
Doctors are thus better protected from liability as compared to, say,
7
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railroads, merchants, car manufacturers, and the like.'17 Business and
industry, on the other hand, may be held liable for negligence even if a
plaintiff fails to show any departure from business custom.' 0 8 Then why are
doctors protected? While some legal historians have argued that "doctors
as a class may be more likely to exert their best efforts than drovers,
railroads and merchants,"'0 9 others conclude that "no other standard is
practical," given the difficulty faced by the courts in determining whether a
physician exercised reasonable medical care. ' 0 Plaintiffs must thus rely on
expert medical testimony to prove a case."'
The term "average" is sometimes used in conjunction with-or in
place of-the term "ordinary" in reference to the standards. 2 In Holtzman
v. Hoy,"' an American court interpreted such terms as referring to an
ordinary "good" physician.14 However, courts retain leeway for jury
instructions," 5 and jurors may thus have variable understandings of these
issues. Ordinary/average standards have been translated into "minimum
standards" when applied to scientific realms. For example, in Hazel v.
Mullen,"6 a case involving adverse health consequences from an x-ray
machine, the plaintiff was unsuccessful despite presenting expert
testimony of additional precautionary measures that the defendant may
have taken to protect the plaintiff from injury. "7 The defendant had
demonstrated compliance with a scientifically recognized standard, which
relied in large part on the ordinary judgment of the treating physician." 8
While expert medical testimony is usually indispensable for
establishing a medical standard of care, there are exceptions. For example,
such testimony is not required when a patient suffers burns from a hot
compress post-operatively,119 or if a physician accidentally knocks a healthy
tooth from a patient's mouth prior to surgery.120 Exceptions apply in
particular for lapses in care subject to "common knowledge." 2 ' The
common knowledge standard is applied (often in conjunction with the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitor) most frequently in cases where foreign objects
are left in patients' bodies during operations. 122 To utilize such a standard,
negligence must be "so grossly apparent that a layman would have no
difficulty recognizing it."'' 23 Application of this rule varies by jurisdiction. 124
Plaintiffs have attempted to circumvent the professional standard of
care when the line between "common knowledge" and "medical
knowledge" is blurred. In Stepakoff v. Kantor,'2' a jury found for the
defendant psychiatrist in a case alleging negligence for a patient's
suicide. Plaintiff appealed, claiming that although the psychiatrist may
not have breached the ordinary medical standard of care, common sense
dictated the need for additional measures, such as involuntary
hospitalization, to protect against suicide. 27 The court affirmed the jury
11:1 (2001)
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verdict, holding the standard of care cannot be divided into medical
standard on the one hand, and reasonableness standard on the other
hand.28 It distinguished its ruling from Tarasoffv. Regents of the University of
California, 2 9 a case involving a psychiatrist's duty to protect a third party
(not a patient) under a reasonable care (not a professional standard of
care) analysis.'30
Physicians enjoy further protection from liability when they choose
between providing two or more appropriate alternative medical
treatments. In Morlino v. Medical Center of Ocean County, 3 1 the court found
that harm resulting from such a choice does not constitute malpractice, so
long as the physician acted with good faith judgment.3 ' This axiom has,
however, been subject to modification. Matthies v. Mastromonaco33 clarified
that the patient, not the physician, must ultimately choose, and the
standard of care is breached if the physician fails to inform the patient of
all alternative treatments. 34 These issues may be particularly relevant to
lawsuits involving managed care/HMOs.
The first reported malpractice suit against a managed care company
was Wickline v. State of California,135 heard on appeal in 1986. In 1976,
Wickline was diagnosed with Leriche's Syndrome, a condition causing
blockage of her aortic artery.13 She subsequently underwent major surgery
in 1977 to alleviate the problem, using a synthetic graft artery. 37 She
experienced major post-operative complications, including vascular
spasms, which threatened to cut off blood flow to her legs and raised the
specter of lower extremity amputation.'38 The treating physicians originally
had approval from the patient's HMO (Medi-Cal) for a ten-day post-
operative stay. 39 Due to the post-operative complications, her physicians,
with assistance from the hospital case management staff, requested an
additional eight days in the hospital. 4° Medi-Cal asked their employed-
physician consultant to review the case.14 Although Medi-Cal's physician
reviewer was not a vascular specialist, and although he never consulted
such a specialist, nor ever saw or examined the patient himself, Medi-Cal
adopted his recommendation that the patient did not require additional
time in the hospital. 42 Her physician thus discharged her home after the
initial ten days. 43 Her right leg became progressively discolored at home,
and she was re-hospitalized nine days later." However, it was too late to
save her leg, and she ultimately required an above-the-knee amputation.
4
5
Her physician later testified that she would not have lost her leg had she
remained in the hospital as originally requested. 4 The trial court found
for the plaintiff, holding Medi-Cal liable for the plaintiffs injuries, pain,
and suffering. 47 On appeal, the court reversed, reasoning that the
plaintiff's own physician adopted Medi-Cal's decision without sufficient
9
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protest, and was ultimately still responsible for the patient's care when he
wrote the order to discharge her home.'4 The court indicated that the
physician and hospital had alternative avenues to protect the patient's
interest, such as filing a formal appeal with Medi-Cal, or attempting to
contact the reviewing physician directly.1 49 Hence, Medi-Cal was not liable
for the decision to discharge the patient. °15 Further, although the Medi-Cal
physician reviewer may not have optimally analyzed the data before him,
both he and Medi-Cal purportedly followed pertinent legislated state
statutes regarding case review. 1"' Thus, the court ruled, Medi-Cal was not
liable as a matter of law.
1 2
But Wickline did not completely close the door on managed care
liability. The court also stated that "a patient who requires treatment and
who is harmed when care which should have been provided is not
provided should recover for the injuries suffered from all those responsible
for the deprivation of care, including, when appropriate, health care
payers.' ', 53 Thus, managed care entities may be liable when medically
incorrect decisions result from flaws in their cost-containment
mechanisms.
A subsequent case, Wilson v. Blue Cross of Southern California,15 4
supported the concept of liability for HMOs and other insurers. 5 5 In
Wilson, a psychiatric patient committed suicide after his premature
discharge from the hospital.'56 A managed care company's utilization
review purportedly pressured the health care providers to discharge him 5' 7
The insurer argued it was entitled to summary judgment "because there
are important public policy considerations which warrant protecting
insurance companies and related entities which conduct concurrent
utilization review.' '5 8 Unlike Wickline, the Wilson court noted that despite
the physician's decision to discharge the patient, the insurer might also be
held at least partially liable if its negligent conduct acted as a substantial
factor in causing harm.' 59 Wilson thus appears to allow a jurisprudential
bifurcation between the physician's professional standard of care and an
insurer's duty to act under a reasonable standard of conduct.' 6
In Fox v. Health Net, the plaintiffs used contract theory to successfully
sue an HMO that denied coverage for a bone marrow transplant to treat
breast, cancer. 6' The jury awarded $77 million for punitive damages after
finding breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress
"through reckless denial of coverage," and actions in bad faith.' 62 Under
contract theory, there was no need to prove breach of a professional
standard of care, only that there was a breach of a contract for care.163
The employer sponsor of Health Net was a state public school district,
hence not protected by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
11:1 (2001)
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(ERISA)."64 ERISA 65 does not allow recovery of monetary damages due to
an administrator's purported misconduct in the private sector.166 This
preemption is extended to those managed care health insurers sponsored
by private employers.' 67 Had the Fox case involved a private employer's
health plan, the outcome may have been dramatically different. In Durham
v. Health Net,6 8 plaintiffs similar action against a restaurant for monetary
damages under ERISA was dismissed.
69
In June 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled "treatment decisions
made by a health maintenance organization, acting through its physician
employees," are not fiduciary decisions under ERISA 70 The Court
reasoned that Congress never intended to open "the federal courthouse
doors for a fiduciary malpractice claim."' 7' However, in doing so, the Court
may have opened the door to additional litigation at the state level. State
supreme courts in both New York and Pennsylvania have since affirmed
the right of patients to sue their health insurers for negligence, and New
Jersey (among other states) has legislated patients' rights to sue employer-
paid health plans.
7 3
Before the era of managed care, the Washington State Supreme Court
endeavored to foster a radical shift in the medical standard of care
paradigm. In Helling v. Carey,"74 a malpractice action against
ophthalmologists, medical expert testimony tried to establish no
requirement for routine glaucoma testing for patients less than forty years
old. 75 However, the court moved to step outside the traditional legal
construct for medical malpractice. Quoting Justice Learned Hand, the
court emphasized that " [c] ourts must in the end say what is required; there
are precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard will not
excuse their omission."7 6 Disregarding the expert testimony, the court
made its own value judgement: "We therefore hold, as a matter of law, that
the reasonable standard that should have been followed under the
undisputed facts of this case was the timely giving of [a] simple, harmless
pressure test to the plaintiff and that, in failing to do so, the defendants
were negligent. 1 7  The court thus demanded a higher standard than the
professional standard, in effect adjudicating strict liability.7  Although
Helling is not followed today, it demonstrates the courts' potential to
explore nontraditional legal remedies to the standard of care issue.
Consumer dissatisfaction with the present health care system is a
popular topic. TIME magazine notes:
If you visited a doctor any time recently, you know the routine. You wait
an hour for a 10 minute once-over, and you can't get an aspirin tablet or
a band-aid-let alone a referral-without six bean counters and a dozen
paper pushers eyeballing your entire medical history.
79
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Clearly, the health care industry strives to control costs.8 ° Managed
care entities utilize protocols and guidelines for care, creating average
lengths of stay for hospitalizations due to particular conditions, in addition
to "cookbook" approaches to both outpatient and inpatient diagnostic and
treatment decisions.' 8' The medical standard of care now competes with
financial pressures that threaten to usurp it. Not only must physicians
today attend educational seminars to learn of new advances in their field,
they now attend classes to learn how to code their procedures to satisfy
managed care business pressures. 82 Thus, while physicians of past eras have
molded the standard of care unfettered by such concerns, today's
physicians are themselves being molded by corporate/business interests.
The issue remains whether these business/financial interests can
effectively and ethically co-exist with an appropriate standard of care.
Avedis Donabedian helped develop quality control systems for hospitals
and has been described as "the father of quality assurance. He believes
that "healthcare is a sacred mission.. .a moral enterprise and a scientific
enterprise but not fundamentally a commercial one."'
185
III. RECENT LITERATURE ON THE MEDICAL STANDARD OF CARE IN
JUXTAPOSITION WITH MANAGED CARE REALITIES
Legal scholars have written hundreds of articles attempting to define
and analyze the complex medico-legal interplay between managing
medical care and maintaining the quality of that care. 86 Various authors
propose to hold managed care entities accountable for their actions in
either tort or contract theory.
Wertheimer, for example, argues in favor of the doctrine of
respondent superior.8 7 She holds HMOs responsible as defacto employers
of physicians, but points out that HMOs often persuade courts that
physicians ultimately make independent decisions. 88 Her solution is to
hold HMOs to a reasonableness standard, since "overruling the reasonable
exercise of medical judgment is itself negligence.' '8 9 Thus, if a HMO
reasonably denies authorization for care (e.g., when claiming the proposed
care is unnecessary), the HMO is protected from liability under a
reasonableness doctrine, but if denial is unreasonable, HMOs would be
held accountable.
Advocacy for a "reasonableness standard" suggests HMOs have a duty
to avoid interfering with the provision of adequate health care to patients.
Juries may rule on breach of that duty based upon their own common
knowledge and reasoning. But if a "professional" standard of care still
exists, how could such a case be effectively tried in court? Surely a HMO
would point the finger of responsibility at the ultimate authority-the
11:1 (2001)
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treating physician.' 90 How could the "professional" standard of a physician
be separated from a "reasonable" standard of a HMO, especially when the
HMO utilizes protocols developed by medical physician experts with their
own professional standards?' 9' Wertheimer argues that physicians'
decisions are controlled by HMOs and corporate interests to a point where
HMOs are setting standards and making it difficult, if not impossible, for
doctors to deviate from them. 92
Danzon discussed the potential "mine field" of managed care liability
under tort law, but ultimately rejected the concept:
Health plans should be liable in tort for negligence only in cases of
negligent credentialing. Liability for negligent performance should be
placed solely on the individual provider, who is usually best placed to
make and monitor precautions in the delivery of medical care. Adding
liability of plans, under theories of vicarious, agency, or enterprise
liability, serves only to add an additional deep pocket defendant. To the
extent that this increases the frequency of erroneous findings of liability,
the ability of managed care to control insurance-induced overuse and
improve efficiency in health care delivery will be obstructed.
93
While Wertheimer holds HMOs completely responsible for care,
Danzon claims it is the providers who bear sole responsibility for
decisions. 194 However, Danzon goes on to advocate contract-based claims
against managed care entities, in the context of "contract shifting of
liability between provider and plans," as a means of fostering gains in
health care economic efficiency.9 Despite this, she criticizes the Fox
decision, particularly the punitive damages award, arguing that punitive
damages should not be permitted under such a contract theory, and that
evidence on incentive based HMO contracts should not be admissible
evidence in coverage denial cases.' 96 She believes that punitive liability
under such circumstances would risk obstructing efficiency in the
managed care industry.' 97
Hirshfeld seems to advocate a new form of HMO-patient contract:
[H]ealth plans should be required to disclose information to patients
about their own outcomes and the techniques that they use to eliminate
unnecessary care. This information should be drafted in easily
understood language so that patients can decide whether they are
comfortable with the combination of price and risk used by the health
plan.
198
Yet Hirshfeld claims that patient remedies would still be grounded in tort
theory, not contract theory. He advocates enhanced managed care liability
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through modification of "the tort of bad faith insurance settlements."'1 In
terms of enterprise liability, he is in agreement with Danzon, noting that
such liability could be counterproductive if managed care organizations
felt compelled by liability concerns to exert even more control over
physicians. °°
Hirshfeld's vision of patient "consent" to managed care restrictions
appears to bolster the contract theory construct to managed care liability.
20 1
In an earlier article on standard of care issues, Hirshfeld had proposed
keeping "patient-oriented" standards as a foundation for practice
guidelines in which physicians would be legislatively protected from tort
liability.2 0 2 But who would draft such guidelines, and how would providers,
managed care organizations, and legislators establish a methodology for
agreement on scope and/or acceptable deviations from such guidelines?
20 3
A recent survey of physicians found medical decision-making under
managed care to be restricted by "range," by "degree," and by "latitude,"
suggesting a subtle form of control. 20 4 Arguably, non-overt managed care
influences may not be amenable to either legislation or professional
guidelines. To illustrate the potential subtlety of the problem, the reader is
invited to consider the following hypothetical example:
20 5
Mr. Smith is a sixty-six year-old widower with a history of congestive heart
failure and osteoarthritis. He is insured through a Medicare-approved
HMO. For several months, he has had difficulty walking due to severe
right hip pain. He is informed by his doctor that he needs a hip
replacement due to the severity of his arthritis. He agrees to the surgery,
and his physician obtains appropriate pre-authorization from the HMO
without difficulty. The surgery is performed successfully, and Mr. Smith
begins receiving physical therapy in the hospital the next day. However,
he feels very fatigued and is easily winded by attempts to walk (even when
using a walker). X-rays of his lungs show mild exacerbation of his
congestive heart failure, so his cardiac medications are adjusted.
Although Mr. Smith no longer feels short of breath, he still tires easily.
His physician advises the hospital's nurse case manager of the patient's
decompensated status.
Let's say Mr. Smith's HMO had originally pre-approved a three to
four day hospital stay. How had they arrived at that decision? Managed
care organizations today contract with data-analysis and accounting
firms, seeking statistical justification for clinical pathway decisions,
which reduce the costs of diagnosis and treatments. 16 These firms, and
their analyses, are not necessarily subject to strict scientific scrutiny in
an academic setting.0 7 Although no one at the HMO had examined
Mr. Smith, he may be viewed as a statistically average patient
undergoing an elective hip replacement.21
11:l1(2001)
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The hospital's nurse case manager now calls the HMO's case manager.
After playing phone tag for some hours, the conversation may ultimately
go something like this:
HOSP: Hi Denise. This is Mary from Valley Hospital. I'm calling about
Mr. Smith.
HMO: Yes, I have his information on the screen here. He should be
ready for discharge tomorrow, right?
HOSP: Well, we're concerned about his cardiac status. He was in heart
failure a couple days ago.
HMO: Yes, I remember getting that message on my voice mail. But how
is it now?
HOSP: The chest x-ray today was clear, but the patient is still easily
fatigued when he uses the walker in physical therapy. The
doctor doesn't want to discharge him yet.
HMO: He should get stronger when he's transferred to the Rehab
center.
HOSP: I don't know. His daughter was here and she's also concerned.
HMO: O.K, here's what we'll do. I'll allow him one extra day in the
hospital. Then, if there is no congestion on a repeat chest x-ray,
he has to go to rehab.
HOSP: His daughter wants him to go to the rehabilitation hospital here
in Lakeville.
HMO: We don't have a contract with them for these elective cases. He
can go to a subacute center.
HOSP: You mean one of the local nursing homes with a rehabilitation
wing?
HMO: Yes. Either Cedar Knolls or Belleville.
HOSP: What about Victoria Park? That nursing home has a full time
rehabilitation specialist.
HMO: Sorry, we don't have a contract with that nursing home. Besides,
all he needs is some therapy, and the other places can give him
that.
HOSP: O.K., Can I have the pre-authorization number?
The hospital nurse case manager now calls the patient's attending
physician, Dr. Daye.
HOSP: Dr. Daye? This is Mary from Valley Hospital case management.
DOC: Hi, how are you?
HOSP: Fine. I'm calling you about Mr. Smith. I got pre-authorization
from his HMO to get him over to subacute rehab.
DOC: I thought the family wanted the rehabilitation hospital down the
15
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street. He would do well there. I send all of our regular
Medicare cases there.
HOSP: We can't do it. His HMO only allows subacute rehab at the
nursing homes for elective hip surgery.
DOC: O.K., send him to Dr. Clark at Victoria Park.
HOSP: No, the HMO doesn't contract with them.
DOC: Where then?
HOSP: Cedar Knolls or Belleville.
DOC: But those are just regular nursing homes.
HOSP: I don't know what to tell you doctor. The family has already
agreed. We're just waiting for your discharge order.
DOC: We're still keeping him for the congestive heart failure, though.
HOSP: The HMO is only giving him one more day. They want him out.
DOC- Who did you speak to?
HOSP: The case manager.
DOC: Is the case manager a doctor?
HOSP: No, but I think she might be a nurse.
DOC: I'll only discharge him with a clear chest x-ray. (hangs up)
Dr. Daye feels frustrated. He had originally wanted to keep Mr. Smith
hospitalized two or three more days for observation. However, the
Utilization Management coordinator employed by his hospital (a
physician named Dr. Duff), has been accusing him of unnecessarily
delaying discharges and costing the hospital money. He recently received
the following memorandum from Dr. Duff (as did all of the medical staff,
not only at this hospital, but at all ten hospitals in the hospital
corporation's statewide chain):
We are all affected by Utilization Management decisions-physicians
and hospitals alike. We as physicians are busy treating patients and
none of us like our decisions being questioned by others, including
the UM Committee. However, all of us wish to provide quality care
to our patients.
What is the definition of quality? Traditionally it has been defined as
the degree to which health services for individuals and populations
increase the likelihood of desired health outcome and are consistent
with current professional knowledge. In recent years questions of
cost and limited resources have entered the equation. You and I
know we have to strike a balance so that everyone is happy--patients,
other providers, and payers.
Since Utilization Management focuses on providing appropriate
care in the appropriate setting at the appropriate time, the UM
Committee is really a quality committee. Its main role is to study,
11:1 (2001)
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monitor, and report on issues impacting quality in the process of
health care delivery; and to educate our physicians to practice in a
way that permits good medical decisions, yet minimizes denials and
challenges from insurance carriers.
When we concentrate on the outcome, it increases the efficiency of
the health care delivery process and quality and patient satisfaction
increase while costs decrease. As a result, the market share of our
facility will go up.
The idea is simple, but execution is difficult. However, it is doable
with collaborative teamwork. We need your support.'0°
Mr. Smith's chest x-ray is repeated the next day. The radiologist reports:
"Clear except for possible mild pulmonary vascular congestion. Follow-up
studies if clinically warranted." Dr. Daye sees Mr. Smith on hospital
rounds that morning. On examination, his lungs sound clear, but the
patient still feels fatigued.
DOC: You started the physical therapy already right?
SMITH: Yeah, but I haven't done much since I've been so tired.
DOC: Well, it says here in the chart that you've been walking up to ten
feet with the walker. And the orthopedist says the surgical site is
healing well.
SMITH: Yes. He said I can go for rehab as soon as you clear me for
discharge.
DOC: O.K., I'll discharge you to rehab today. But make certain you let
the staff there know if you have any breathing problems.
SMITH: All right, doc. The HMO covers the rehab, right?
DOC: Yes, so long as you go to either Cedar Knolls or Belleville.
SMITH: I think my daughter already discussed that with the nurse case
manager. She already chose Cedar Knolls. Thanks, doc.
Mr. Smith is transported by ambulance to the nursing home, where he
receives additional physical therapy. He made progress over the
following two weeks, but not as much as his physical therapist had
expected. He continued to have problems not only with generalized
fatigue, but he also occasionally became short of breath. Nursing staff
informed the facility's internist, who saw Mr. Smith twice over the two
weeks, ordered another chest x-ray, and adjusted his medications. The
chest x-ray still appeared clear. His surgical site was closed and almost
completely healed (except for the residual surgical scar). The leg still
had some post-operative swelling, and Mr. Smith still complained about
hip pain, along with shortness of breath while walking. He could now
walk up to one hundred feet with a walker, with no one assisting him.
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The HMO case manager then calls the nursing home case manager.
HMO: How's Mr. Smith doing?
NH: Fine, but the therapist feels he could do even better. He still has
some pain at the hip.
HMO: How far can he walk?
NH: One hundred feet.
HMO: Without assistance?
NH: Without assistance, but he still needs a walker, and he gets
winded very easily.
HIMO: Well, he really needs to be discharged home. Walking one
hundred feet without assistance meets our criteria for discharge.
NH: But I spoke to the doctor yesterday, and he was thinking of
keeping him another week.
HMO: We will not pay for any additional time at your facility. He can
get outpatient physical therapy, and his family will have to
arrange for home health if they feel he needs it. He meets our
criteria for discharge. (The conversation is concluded.)
The nursing home case manager now discusses the situation with the
nursing home's chief administrator. The administrator explains to the
case manager how important the HMO contract is to the nursing home's
financial survival, thus necessitating compliance with HMO guidelines.
He expresses concern that the doctor is not looking at the situation from
the HMO's point of view (nor the nursing home's point of view), and
considers the possibility of contracting alternative doctors to follow
patients at the nursing home in the future. He advises his case manager
to make appropriate home arrangements for the patient. The case
manager then calls the doctor.
NH: We need to send Mr. Smith home. His HMO is cutting him off.
I've made arrangements for visiting nurse service, meals-on-
wheels, and outpatient physical therapy. I also ordered a walker
for him to take home.
DOC: I'll call the nursing station. If his vitals are still normal, we will
send him home. His family is O.K. about him going home?
NH: Oh yes! They don't want to have to pay anything out-of-pocket,
so they want him home as soon as his HMO time is ended.
DOC: It's too bad, you know. If he had traditional fee-for-service
Medicare, he could stay longer.2 10 Does he realize that? You
know, if you want, I could send a formal protest to the HMO,
and try to go through their appeals process.
NH: I don't think the patient realizes the difference between
Medicare and HMO Medicare. Listen, doctor, I really
appreciate your cooperation on this. I know we could formally
11: 1 (200 1)
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appeal the HMO's decision, but we don't want to risk losing
their business in the future.
DOC: I understand. Look I really think he can go home now. We have
had other patients in his situation who we sent home with no
problems. With the HMOs, this is the new standard of care.
(sighs)
Mr. Smith is discharged home after two weeks at the nursing facility. The
following week, he is admitted to the hospital's intensive care unit.
Apparently he was having multiple pulmonary emboli (not picked up on
routine chest x-rays), along with an infection involving the hip
replacement apparatus. In retrospect, his shortness of breath and hip
pain should have been investigated more carefully, and may have been
211
noticed and effectively treated had he remained in an inpatient setting.
Why did his physicians feel comfortable agreeing with treatment
and/or discharge decisions instigated by an insurance carrier? Because the
mentality of cost-containment has blurred the definition of quality
care/standard of care. Some legal scholars believe the answer to this
problem lies in the establishment of a socially and legally recognized
forum for "physician advocacy." 
2 12
CONCLUSION
Proposed solutions to this standard of care dilemma vary across the
spectrum of legal theories and socio-political views. Some legal scholars
claim society ultimately demands compliance with the traditional medical
213professional standard of care, while others propose that hospitals, HMOs,
and physicians be allowed variable standards of care based upon society's
desire to control costs. 2 4 Such variable standards could purportedly be2116
applied under tort theory,2 5 or under contract theory.216 Regardless of how
these variable standard proposals have been constructed, they appear to
saddle courts with burdensome cost-versus-benefit inquiries and/or
contract analyses of variations at the level of the individual health plans.
Proponents of variable standards appear to assume consumer knowledge
and acquiescence to a reduced standard of care, which they purportedly
"bargained" for.2 17 Does this ring true for the factory worker who obtains
HMO coverage for herself and children through her employer? Does Mrs.
Jones know that hospital A has a managed care contract that pressures
physicians and the hospital to discharge cardiac patients earlier than
hospital B?21 And intrinsic to this entire issue of "standard of care," is it not
contradictory to say the issue is being forced upon the public by the
constraints of rising health care costs, while HMO and other corporate
19
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health care interests reap profits through the de facto rationing of care to
patients? 29 To some, the beguiling nature of this issue poses a question
akin to one of good versus evil: "No one can serve two masters, for either
he will hate the one and love the other, or he will be devoted to the one
,,120
and despise the other. You cannot serve G-d and mammon.
Even assuming managed care interests may one day be held
accountable for their actions, the question remains: How shall the
standard of care be defined? This Article has traced the development of
the medical standard of care through 500 years of English and American
law. Through a culture of deference to superior medical knowledge,
combined with historical happenstance (e.g., the Black Plague and King
Henry VIII's desire for a royal-chartered College of Physicians and
Surgeons), physicians were placed on society's pedestal, entrusted with
setting their own standards of care. Thus, the legal community and courts
recognized a medical professional standard, which shielded physicians
from much of the liability commonly applicable to business commercial
interests. However, recent cost-cutting trends may degrade and corrupt the
historical trust granted to physicians. In order to comport with the reality
of modern day health care, American jurisprudential constructs on
medical standard care must evolve in conjunction with these modem
trends. Given the competing views of tort theory versus contract theory,
traditional standards versus variable standards, and patient advocacy versus
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infection and pulmonary embolism).
212. See generally Sage, supra note 3.
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